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INTRODUCTION 
 This Article provides a summary of federal circuit court 
cases decided in 2018. By the end of 2018, every circuit except 
for the Eighth has adopted a Two-Part Test for Second 
Amendment cases. In Part One, the court determines whether 
the challenged law burdens the Second Amendment right. If so, 
the court applies heightened scrutiny in Part Two. Courts in 
Second Amendment cases almost always apply intermediate 
scrutiny, but strict scrutiny and categorical invalidation are also 
available.  
 The Two-Part Test is detailed in our article, The Federal 
Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines.1 That article reviews 
every federal circuit Second Amendment case after District of 
Columbia v. Heller (2008), up to approximately August 2016. 
I.  FIRST CIRCUIT 
A.  UPHOLDING “MAY ISSUE” CARRY SCHEME, GOULD V. 
MORGAN 
Under Massachusetts law, licensees may: 
 
purchase, rent, lease, borrow, possess and carry: 
(i) firearms, including large capacity firearms, 
 
1 David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits Second 
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193 (2017) (cited in Pena v. 
Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 1004 (9th Cir. 2018) (Bybee, J., dissenting)). 
76                     7 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020) 
 
 
and feeding devices and ammunition therefor, 
for all lawful purposes, subject to such 
restrictions relative to the possession, use or 
carrying of firearms as the licensing authority 
deems proper.2  
 
A license may be issued if the applicant “has good reason to fear 
injury . . . or for any other reason, including the carrying of 
firearms for use in sport or target practice only.”3 
For a general carry license, both Boston and Brookline 
require applicants to demonstrate that they have a greater need 
for self-defense than that of the general public. If an applicant 
fails to do so, he might still receive a license, but typically under 
specified restrictions. “Boston offers licenses restricted to 
employment, hunting and target practice, or sport. For its part, 
Brookline offers licenses subject to restrictions for employment, 
hunting, target practice, sport, transport, domestic (use only in 
and around one's home), or collecting.”4 
The plaintiffs challenged the Boston and Brookline 
policies after each received a license that restricted the purpose 
for which he could carry. For instance, one license was 
restricted to employment and sporting purposes. Another was 
restricted to hunting and target-practice. The plaintiffs argued 
that they had a right to carry firearms generally for self-defense.  
The First Circuit phrased the issues as such:  
 
Does the Second Amendment protect the right to 
carry a firearm outside the home for self-
defense? And if they prevail on that question, 
may the government condition the exercise of 
the right to bear arms on a showing that a citizen 
has a “good reason” (beyond a generalized 
desire for self-defense) for carrying a firearm 
outside the home?5 
 
To analyze these questions, the First Circuit adopted the 
Two-Part Test for the first time. This development was notable 
because previously, the First Circuit relied on the competing 
 
2 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 131(a). 
3 Id. § 131(d). 
4 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 664 (1st Cir. 2018). 
5 Id. at 666.  
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test of text, history, and tradition more than any other circuit. 
Now, the Eighth Circuit is the only remaining circuit that has 
not adopted the Two-Part Test.6  
In Part One, the court determined that the right to bear 
arms applies beyond the home to some extent:   
 
The Supreme Court's seminal decision 
in Heller guides our voyage. The Heller Court 
left no doubt that the right to bear arms “for 
defense of self, family, and property” was “most 
acute” inside the home. 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct. 
2783. If the right existed solely within the home, 
the Court's choice of phrase would have been 
peculiar. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 
935-36 (7th Cir. 2012). So, too, the Heller Court 
stated that prohibitions on carrying firearms in 
“sensitive places” are “presumptively lawful,” 
554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783—a 
pronouncement that would have been 
completely unnecessary if the Second 
Amendment right did not extend beyond the 
home at all. Reading these tea leaves, we 
view Heller as implying that the right to carry a 
firearm for self-defense guaranteed by the 
Second Amendment is not limited to the home.7 
 
In Part Two, however, the court determined that the 
application beyond the home is very limited, and that the core 
of the right is in the home:  
 
We make explicit today what was implicit 
in Hightower: that the core Second Amendment 
right is limited to self-defense in the home. . . . 
this configuration of the Second Amendment's 
core interest is consistent with Heller, in which 
the Court declared that the home is where “the 
need for defense of self, family, and property is 
 
6 This does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court will approve 
the Two-Part Test. As Judge Bibas recently pointed out, “Heller 
overruled nine” circuit courts. Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol 
Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. New Jersey, 910 F.3d 106, 134 (3d Cir. 
2018) (Bibas, J., dissenting). 
7 Gould, 907 F.3d at 670. 
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most acute,” such that the Second Amendment 
“elevates above all other interests the ... defense 
of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 628, 635, 128 
S.Ct. 2783; see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. 
Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that the Heller Court “went to great 
lengths to emphasize the special place that the 
home—an individual's private property—
occupies in our society”). 
 
Societal considerations also suggest that the 
public carriage of firearms, even for the purpose 
of self-defense, should be regarded as falling 
outside the core of the Second Amendment 
right. The home is where families reside, where 
people keep their most valuable possessions, 
and where they are at their most vulnerable 
(especially while sleeping at night). Outside the 
home, society typically relies on police officers, 
security guards, and the watchful eyes of 
concerned citizens to mitigate threats. This same 
panoply of protections is much less effective 
inside the home. Police may not be able to 
respond to calls for help quickly, so an 
individual within the four walls of his own 
house may need to provide for the protection of 
himself and his family in case of emergency. 
Last—but surely not least—the availability of 
firearms inside the home implicates the safety 
only of those who live or visit there, not the 
general public. 
 
Viewed against this backdrop, the right to self-
defense—upon which the plaintiffs rely—is at its 
zenith inside the home. This right is plainly more 
circumscribed outside the home. “[O]utside the 
home, firearm rights have always been more 
limited, because public safety interests often 
outweigh individual interests in self-
defense.” United States v. Masciandaro, 638 
F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). These truths are 
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especially evident in densely populated urban 
areas like Boston and Brookline.8 
 
Because “[p]ublic carriage of firearms for self-defense 
falls outside the perimeter of this core right,” the court found 
intermediate scrutiny appropriate.9 “It cannot be gainsaid that 
Massachusetts has compelling governmental interests in both 
public safety and crime prevention,” so the question was 
whether the licensing scheme was substantially related to those 
interests.10 
 
Here, the fit between the asserted governmental 
interests and the means chosen to advance them 
is close enough to pass intermediate scrutiny. 
The challenged regime does not infringe at all on 
the core Second Amendment right of a citizen to 
keep arms in his home for the purpose of self-
defense. Outside the home, the regime arguably 
does burden a citizen's non-core Second 
Amendment right. See supra Sections III.B, 
III.C. But in allocating this burden, the 
Massachusetts legislature was cognizant that 
firearms can present a threat to public safety. 
Striving to strike a balance, the legislature took 
note that some individuals might have a 
heightened need to carry firearms for self-
defense and allowed local licensing authorities 
to take a case-by-case approach in deciding 
whether a particular “applicant has good reason 
to fear injury.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(d). 
In addition, the legislature made appropriate 
provisions for restricted licenses, thus ensuring 
that individuals may carry firearms while 
engaging in hunting, target-shooting, and a host 
of other pursuits. Those same protections extend 




8 Id. at 671–72. 
9 Id. at 672. 
10 Id. at 673. 
11 Id. at 674. 
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Like some other circuits,  the First Circuit applied the 
intermediate scrutiny rule that the law must not be 
substantially more burdensome than necessary:  
 
the fit between the asserted governmental 
interests and the means chosen by the legislature 
to advance them need only be substantial in 
order to withstand intermediate scrutiny. . . . 
Courts have described this requirement in 
various ways. A typical formulation—with 
which we agree—describes it as “a reasonable fit 
. . . such that the law does not burden more 
conduct than is reasonably necessary.”12 
 
The court determined that the may-issue carry law did not 
burden more conduct than reasonably necessary and upheld it.  
II.  SECOND CIRCUIT 
It is no secret that the Second Amendment is often 
treated as a second-class right in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits.13 Within this trifecta of circuits, the Second Circuit is 
the most hostile. Second Amendment plaintiffs have been 
known to win cases in federal district courts in the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits. In the Ninth, they sometimes even win before 
three-judge panels—although so far, such wins have later been 
overturned en banc. In the Second Circuit, hostility to the Second 
Amendment is more hegemonic.14  
 
12 Id. (quoting Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
13 See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Data Indicate Second Amendment 
Underenforcement, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 79 (2018). 
14 Thus, in a case challenging New York’s vague statute on gravity 
knives (which New York City police used against common folding 
knives), the plaintiffs wisely did not frame the case as a Second 
Amendment issue, even though knives are Second Amendment arms. 
See Copeland v. Vance, 893 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2018); see generally David 
B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Knives and the 
Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 175 (2013) (cited with 
approval in Seattle v. Evans, 366 P.3d 906 (Wash. 2015) (by both 
majority and dissent)); State v. Herrmann, 873 N.W.2d 257 (Wisc. Ct. 
App. 2015); State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165 (Conn. 2014); People v. 
Trowells, No. 3015/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2014). 
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In the last year, the Second Circuit’s most important 
decision upheld a ban on licensed handgun owners taking their 
registered handguns out of New York City. A somewhat better-
reasoned decision upheld the federal Gun Control Act’s 
prohibition on firearms possession by persons who were 
dishonorably discharged from the military. 
A.  CITY MAY PROHIBIT LICENSED HANDGUN OWNERS FROM 
TAKING THEIR HANDGUNS OUT OF THE CITY. NEW YORK 
STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASS’N, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK 
In New York, one must obtain a license to own a 
handgun. There are two types of licenses: “carry” licenses and 
“premises” licenses.15 “A carry license allows an individual to 
‘have and carry [a] concealed’ handgun ‘without regard to 
employment or place of possession.’” But it is only granted 
“when proper cause exists” for the issuance of the license.16 
 
“Proper cause” is not defined by the Penal Law, 
but New York State courts have defined the term 
to include carrying a handgun for target 
practice, hunting, or self-defense. When an 
applicant demonstrates proper cause to carry a 
handgun for target practice or hunting, the 
licensing officer may restrict a carry license “to 
the purposes that justified the issuance.”17 
 
In New York City, carry permits are issued to retired 
law enforcement, celebrities, and other favored persons. In 
contrast, the city’s police department does (reluctantly and 
slowly) issue to ordinary citizens licenses to keep handguns in 
their homes. A “premises” license is limited to the premise 
specified on the license. The firearm can be removed from that 
premise for only very limited reasons, such as to “transport 
her/his handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small 
arms range/shooting club, unloaded, in a locked container, the 
ammunition to be carried separately.”18 Administratively, the 
 
15 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 400.00(2)(a), (f). 
16 Id. § 400.00(2)(f). 
17 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 
F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2018) (“NYSRPA”). 
18 38 R.C.N.Y. § 5-23(a) (2019). 
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city’s police department has declared that an “authorized” 
shooting range is only a range located in New York City. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the limitations of their 
premises licenses violated the Second Amendment, since they 
wanted to transport their firearms beyond their premises for 
various reasons not included in the statute or in the New York 
City regulations. 
Specifically, one plaintiff wanted to take his handgun 
licensed for his residence in New York City to his second home 
in Hancock, New York. Other plaintiffs wanted to take their 
handguns licensed to premises in New York City to out-of-city 
firing ranges and shooting competitions. 
The court skipped immediately to Part Two of the Two-
Part Test: “At the first step, the Plaintiffs argue that Rule 5-23 
impinges on conduct protected by the Second Amendment. We 
need not decide whether that is so, because, as explained below, 
the Rule passes constitutional muster under intermediate 
scrutiny.”19 
The law that prohibited one plaintiff from taking his 
firearm to his second home warranted mere intermediate 
scrutiny because he could possibly acquire a separate firearm 
for that second home. 
The prohibition on taking firearms outside the city for 
range training and shooting competitions similarly warranted 
merely intermediate scrutiny. The court recognized the 
importance of training, but only to the extent that it was 
necessary to acquire and maintain the skill necessary to protect 
oneself and family, and the general public:  
 
restrictions that limit the ability of firearms 
owners to acquire and maintain proficiency in 
the use of their weapons can rise to a level that 
significantly burdens core Second Amendment 
protections. Possession of firearms without 
adequate training and skill does nothing to 
protect, and much to endanger, the gun owner, 
his or her family, and the general public. 
Accordingly, we may assume that the ability to 
obtain firearms training and engage in firearm 
practice is sufficiently close to core Second 
Amendment concerns that regulations that 
 
19 NYSRPA, 883 F.3d at 55 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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sharply restrict that ability to obtain such 
training could impose substantial burdens on 
core Second Amendment rights. Some form of 
heightened scrutiny would be warranted in such 
cases, however, not because live-fire target 
shooting is itself a core Second Amendment 
right, but rather because, and only to the extent 
that, regulations amounting to a ban (either 
explicit or functional) on obtaining firearms 
training and practice substantially burden the 
core right to keep and use firearms in self-
defense in the home. Indeed, if the Plaintiffs' 
broader argument were accepted, every 
regulation that applied to businesses that 
provide firearms training or firing-range use 
would itself require heightened scrutiny, a result 
far from anything the Supreme Court has 
required.20 
 
The court noted that the city’s “Rule 5-23 allows a holder 
of a premises license to take the handgun licensed for his or her 
New York City premises to an authorized firing range in the 
City to engage in practice, training exercises, and shooting 
competitions”21 and that “[t]he record evidence demonstrates 
that seven firing ranges in New York City are available to any 
premises license-holder.”22 
The court upheld the ban under intermediate scrutiny 
based on an apparent distrust of licensed armed citizens in 
general:  
 
In a detailed affidavit, the former Commander of 
the License Division, Andrew Lunetta, 
discussed why taking a licensed handgun to a 
second home or a shooting competition outside 
the City, even under the restrictions imposed by 
the Rule for permitted transportation, 
constitutes a potential threat to public safety. He 
explained that premises license holders “are just 
as susceptible as anyone else to stressful 
 
20 Id. at 58–59. 
21 Id. at 59.  
22 Id. at 60. 
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situations,” including driving situations that can 
lead to road rage, “crowd situations, 
demonstrations, family disputes,” and other 
situations “where it would be better to not have 
the presence of a firearm.” Accordingly, he 
stated, the City has a legitimate need to control 
the presence of firearms in public, especially 
those held by individuals who have only a 
premises license, and not a carry license. He 
went on to discuss how “public safety will be 
compromised” unless the regulations 
concerning when and where premises licensees 
can transport their firearms “can be effectively 
monitored and enforced, and are not easily 
ignored or susceptible to being violated.”23 
 
Lunetta added examples of “abuses” that occurred when 
citizens were allowed to transport their handguns to out-of-city 
shooting ranges: licensees traveling “with loaded firearms, 
licensees found with firearms nowhere near the vicinity of an 
authorized range, licensees taking their firearms on airplanes, 
and licensees . . . with their firearms during hours where no 
authorized range was open.”24 Based largely on Lunetta’s 
affidavit, the regulation was upheld.  
B.  UPHOLDING PROHIBITED PERSONS LAW FOR PERSONS 
DISHONORABLY DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY. 
UNITED STATES V. JIMENEZ 
Oscar Sanchez paid Jose Jimenez $40 to drive him to a 
parking lot where Sanchez had arranged to sell 20 handguns to 
someone who turned out to be an undercover NYPD detective. 
Sanchez transferred a black bag to the detective’s car, but no 
 
23 Id. at 63 (citations omitted).  
24 Id. (brackets in original). In 2019, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case. Attempting to moot the case, New York City 
repealed the regulation. At oral argument on Dec. 2, 2019, the City 
admitted that ending the regulation had not harmed public safety in 
the slightest. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. City of New York, 
No. 18-280, Transcript at 52 (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transc
ripts/2019/18-280_j4ek.pdf.   
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guns were inside—only a box of Capri Sun and a carjack. No 
exchange of firearms occurred. 
As part of the operation, after Jimenez and Sanchez 
drove away, two ATF agents pulled them over. During this 
stop, Sanchez took the round chambered in the handgun he 
carried and handed it to Jimenez. Soon after, the agents 
discovered the round and further discovered that Jimenez had 
previously been dishonorably discharged from the Marines.25 
Jimenez was subsequently convicted for violating 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(6), which prohibits anyone who “has been 
discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions” from possessing firearms or ammunition “in or 
affecting commerce.” Jimenez appealed, arguing that § 
922(g)(6) violates the Second Amendment.  
In this case, the Second Circuit became the first Circuit 
Court to consider the constitutionality of the ban since Heller.  
Applying the Two-Part Test, the court quickly jumped 
to Part Two: 
 
Proceeding with our usual caution, we find that 
it is unnecessary to determine whether Jimenez 
can claim any Second Amendment protections 
because even if we assume (without deciding) 
that he can, we conclude that those protections 
do not preclude his conviction under Section 
922(g)(6).26 
 
The court decided intermediate scrutiny was 
appropriate, because “those who, like Jimenez, have been 
found guilty of felony-equivalent conduct by a military tribunal 
are not among those ‘law-abiding and responsible’ persons 
whose interests in possessing firearms are at the Amendment’s 
core.”27 
 
25 Jimenez had served “18 months in a military prison for conspiracy 
to sell military property, wrongful disposition of military property, 
use and possession of a controlled substance, and conduct of a nature 
to bring discredit upon the armed forces, in violation of 10 U.S.C. §§ 
881, 908, 912a, 934. He had been convicted of these offenses after 
confessing to using and dealing ecstasy and to possessing and selling 
firearms and night vision goggles that had been stolen from the 
military.” United States v. Jimenez, 895 F.3d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 2018). 
26 Id. at 234. 
27 Id. at 235. 
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Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to prove 
that the law is substantially related to an important 
governmental interest. The court held that the government did 
so, even though “the government presents no studies, no 
empirical data, no expert testimony, no legislative findings...to 
substantiate the belief that no dishonorably discharged veteran 
may be trusted with a bullet.”28  
The government met its burden of proof because “the 
government relie[d] on the fact that those convicted of felonies 
have been widely found to be more dangerous with deadly 
weapons [and] Jimenez was discharged for felony-equivalent 
conduct:”29 
 
Section 922(g)(6) became law as part of the Gun 
Control Act of 1968, which creates similar bans 
for other “special risk groups”: felons, fugitives, 
illegal drug users and addicts, the mentally 
incompetent, those who have “been committed 
to a mental institution,” undocumented 
immigrants, individuals with nonimmigrant 
visas, those who have renounced United States 
citizenship, those subject to a domestic violence 
order of protection, and those convicted of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. When 
the military discharge provision of the Gun 
Control Act was introduced, it was treated as of 
a piece with all of these special risk groups and 
specifically with the felon ban. That portion of 
the Gun Control Act was meant to deprive those 
who had demonstrated an inability or 
unwillingness to take others’ safety into account, 
or otherwise might be especially dangerous with 
a gun, from possessing deadly weapons.30 
 
 Does the court’s reasoning allow a class of persons to be 
prohibited from exercising a constitutional right simply 
because Congress listed them among other classes that could 
justifiably be prohibited? Perhaps not, for the court elaborated:  
 
 
28 Id. at 236 (internal quotations omitted). 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted). 
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There is no reason to think that Jimenez is more 
likely to handle a gun responsibly just because 
his conviction for dealing drugs and stolen 
military equipment (including firearms) 
occurred in a military tribunal rather than in 
state or federal court.31 
 
Thus, the prohibition for persons with dishonorable discharges 
was, in the case of Jimenez, the equivalent of prohibitive felony 
convictions. The court’s reasoning should not be extended to 
dishonorable discharges for other reasons, such as to persons 
who received a dishonorable discharge for having a 
homosexual orientation.  
Lastly, Jimenez attempted to distinguish ammunition 
from firearms, arguing that “‘[a] bullet is categorically less 
dangerous than a gun’ since ‘even an unloaded gun can be used 
to menace, threaten, or strike a victim.’” But the court was 
unpersuaded. As the court pointed out, “[g]uns are not 
regulated because they can be used as blunt objects: tire irons 
and baseball bats remain legal. Guns are regulated because of 
their capacity to launch bullets at speeds sufficient to cleave 
flesh and shatter bone. Without bullets, guns do not have that 
capacity.”32 
III.  THIRD CIRCUIT 
A.  UPHOLDING A BAN ON MAGAZINES WITH A GREATER 
THAN 10-ROUND CAPACITY, ASS'N OF NEW JERSEY RIFLE 
& PISTOL CLUBS, INC. V. ATTORNEY GEN. NEW JERSEY 
In June 2018, New Jersey reduced its 15-round magazine 
limit established in 199033 to 10 rounds.34 Owners of the newly-
outlawed magazines had until December 10, 2018 to “[t]ransfer 
the semi-automatic rifle or magazine to any person or firm 
lawfully entitled to own or possess that firearm or magazine,” 
“[r]ender the semi-automatic rifle or magazine inoperable or 
permanently modify a large capacity ammunition magazine to 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 238. 
33 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-1(y), -3(j) (2014). 
34 Id. § 2C:39-19. 
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accept 10 rounds or less,” or “[v]oluntarily surrender the semi-
automatic rifle or magazine.”35 
Before beginning its two-part analysis, the court had to 
determine whether magazines are “arms” under the Second 
Amendment. It decided that “[b]ecause magazines feed 
ammunition into certain guns, and ammunition is necessary for 
such a gun to function as intended, magazines are ‘arms’ within 
the meaning of the Second Amendment.”36 
In Part One of the Two-Part Test, the court considers 
whether the challenged regulation burdens the Second 
Amendment. For an arms ban, the court must “consider 
whether the type of arm at issue is commonly owned”37 and 
“typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”38 The court acknowledged that “millions of 
magazines are owned, often come factory standard with semi-
automatic weapons, are typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for hunting, pest-control, and occasionally self-defense, 
and there is no longstanding history of LCM [large-capacity 
magazine] regulation.”39 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to 
Part Two merely “assum[ing] without deciding that LCMs are 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes 
and that they are entitled to Second Amendment protection.”40 
In determining the level of scrutiny in Part Two, the 
court found that the law “does not severely burden the core 
Second Amendment right to self-defense in the home for five 
reasons.”41  
“First, the Act, which prohibits possession of magazines 
with capacities over ten rounds, does not categorically ban a 
class of firearms. The ban applies only to magazines capable of 
 
35 Id.  
36 Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. New 
Jersey, 910 F.3d 106, 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (“ANJRPC”). 
37 Id. The court stated that “‘[c]ommon use’ is not dispositive since 
weapons illegal at the time of a lawsuit would not be (or at least 
should not be) in common use and yet still may be entitled to 
protection.” Id. at 117 n.15 (citing Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 
784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir.2015)). 
38 Id. at 116. 
39 Id.at 116–17 (citations omitted).  
40 Id. at 117.  
41 Id. 
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holding more than ten rounds and thus restricts possession of 
only a subset of magazines that are over a certain capacity.”42  
“Second, unlike the ban in Heller, the Act is not ‘a 
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly 
chosen by American society for [self-defense in the home].’ . . . 
The record here demonstrates that LCMs are not well-suited for 
self-defense.”43 
“Third, also unlike the handgun ban in Heller, a 
prohibition on large-capacity magazines does not effectively 
disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend 
themselves. Put simply, the Act here does not take firearms out 
of the hands of law-abiding citizens, which was the result of the 
law at issue in Heller. The Act allows law-abiding citizens to 
retain magazines, and it has no impact on the many other 
firearm options that individuals have to defend themselves in 
their home.”44 
“Fourth, the Act does not render the arm at issue here 
incapable of operating as intended. New Jersey citizens may 
still possess and utilize magazines, simply with five fewer 
rounds per magazine.”45 
“Fifth, ‘it cannot be the case that possession of a firearm 
in the home for self-defense is a protected form of possession 
under all circumstances. By this rationale, any type of firearm 
possessed in the home would be protected merely because it 
could be used for self-defense.’”46 
Since “it does not severely burden, and in fact respects, 
the core of the Second Amendment right,” the court applied 
intermediate scrutiny.47  
The Third Circuit determined the ban “reasonably fits 
the State’s interest in promoting public safety”48 because “[n]ot 
only will the LCM ban reduce the number of shots fired and the 
resulting harm, it will present opportunities for victims to flee 
and bystanders to intervene.”49 
 
42 Id. (quotation omitted). 
43 Id. at 118 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628). 
44 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 
2010)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 119. 
49 Id. 
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Recognizing its need to consider less burdensome 
alternatives in intermediate scrutiny, the court found that “the 
Act does not burden more conduct than reasonably necessary” 
because it “does not disarm an individual” and it “imposes no 
limit on the number of firearms or magazines or amount of 
ammunition a person may lawfully possess.”50  
Judge Bibas dissented. He first wrote that strict scrutiny 
was more appropriate than intermediate scrutiny. Since the 
magazines are commonly owned for self-defense in the home, 
the ban burdened the core of the Second Amendment right—
and when the core of other constitutional rights are burdened, 
the law is either categorically unconstitutional51 or strict 
scrutiny applies.52  
Judge Bibas argued that the majority committed several 
errors in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny:  
 
First and most fundamentally, the majority 
weighs the merits of the right to possess large 
magazines.53 . . . The majority observes that the 
record is unclear on how many people fire more 
than ten rounds in self-defense . . . But the 
Second Amendment provides a right to 
“keep and bear Arms.” It protects possessing 
arms, not just firing them. So the majority misses 
a key part of the Second Amendment. The 
 
50 Id. at 122.  
51 Id. at 127 (Bibas, J., dissenting). Judge Bibas cited Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial) and Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause).  
52 Id. at 127 (Bibas, J., dissenting) (“The ‘bedrock principle’ of the Free 
Speech Clause forbids limiting speech just because it is ‘offensive or 
disagreeable.’ Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 
L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). So content-based speech restrictions get strict 
scrutiny. Id. at 412, 109 S.Ct. 2533. The Free Exercise Clause was 
designed as a bulwark against ‘religious persecution and 
intolerance.’ Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). So laws that target religion or religious conduct get 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217. And the Equal Protection 
Clause targets classifications that historically were used to 
discriminate. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236, 
115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). So laws that classify based on 
race get strict scrutiny. Id. at 235, 115 S.Ct. 2097.”).  
53 Id. at 128 (Bibas, J., dissenting).  
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analysis cannot turn on how many bullets are 
fired.54  
 
Moreover, it is contrary to the way courts apply 
heightened scrutiny to select the tier of scrutiny after 
considering the severity of the burden. “Polling defensive gun 
uses and alternatives to set a level of scrutiny, as the majority 
does, boils down to forbidden interest-balancing. Any gun 
regulation limits gun use for both crime and self-defense. And 
any gun restriction other than a flat ban on guns will leave 
alternative weapons. So the majority’s test amounts to weighing 




though it denies it, the majority effectively 
cabins Heller’s core to bans on handguns. . . . 
People commonly possess large magazines to 
defend themselves and their families in their 
homes. That is exactly why banning them 
burdens the core Second Amendment right. For 
any other right, that would be the end of our 
analysis; for the Second Amendment, the 
majority demands something much more 
severe.56 
 
Judge Bibas argued that the majority not only chose the 
wrong standard of review, it misapplied the standard. 
Specifically, the government had not been required to (and did 
not) prove that the law was effective;57 the government was not 
required to prove that substantially less burdensome 
alternatives were unavailable;58 and the majority considered 
how often the banned magazines are actually used in self-
defense, which was inconclusive and irrelevant.59 
Consequently, “[t]he majority’s watered-down ‘intermediate 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (citations omitted). 
56 Id. at 129–30 (Bibas, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 130–131 (Bibas, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 130–133 (Bibas, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 133 (Bibas, J., dissenting).  
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scrutiny’ is really rational-basis review,” far different from the 
intermediate scrutiny applied when other rights are at issue.60  
IV.  FOURTH CIRCUIT 
E.  UPHOLDING BAN ON FELONS AND USERS OF ILLEGAL 
DRUGS. U.S. V. YATES 
A jury convicted Meredith Yates and Kevin Vanover of 
several firearms offenses, including possession of a firearm by 
a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); 
possession of a firearm by an illegal drug user in violation of § 
922(g)(3), 924(a)(2); and possession of an unregistered firearm 
in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), 5871 (2012).61  
On appeal, Yates and Vanover argued “that the Second 
Amendment does not allow the government to limit gun 
ownership based on prior convictions or marijuana use.”62 But 
Heller stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to 
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons. . . .”63 And the Fourth Circuit previously held 
in U.S. v. Carter that the ban on illegal drug users 
“proportionally advances the government's legitimate goal of 
preventing gun violence and is therefore constitutional under 
the Second Amendment.”64 So the conviction was quickly 
affirmed.  
Yates and Vanover petitioned for certiorari on October 
31, 2018. The petition was denied on December 3, 2018.  
V.  FIFTH CIRCUIT 
A.  UPHOLDING BAN ON HANDGUN SALES TO RESIDENTS OF 
OTHER STATES. MANCE V. SESSIONS 
District of Columbia residents Andrew and Tracy 
Hanson traveled to Texas to purchase handguns from Fredric 
Mance, a federally licensed firearms dealer (“FFL”). They did 
 
60 Id. (Bibas, J., dissenting).  
61 United States v. Yates, 746 Fed. Appx. 162, 163 (4th Cir. 2018).  
62 Id. at 164. 
63 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
64 United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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so because D.C. has only one FFL, who has no inventory and 
charges $125 for each firearms transfer.  
The Hansons could legally purchase firearms under the 
laws of both Texas and the District of Columbia. The District’s 
laws allow a resident to buy handguns outside the District. 
However, federal law prohibits an FFL from selling handguns 
to out-of-state residents.65 Federal law would permit Mance to 
 
65 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and (b)(3) provide that:  
(a) It shall be unlawful—
... 
(3) for any person, other than a licensed 
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector to transport into or receive in the 
State where he resides (or if the person is a 
corporation or other business entity, the State where 
it maintains a place of business) any firearm 
purchased or otherwise obtained by such person 
outside that State, except that this paragraph (A) shall 
not preclude any person who lawfully acquires a 
firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State 
other than his State of residence from transporting 
the firearm into or receiving it in that State, if it is 
lawful for such person to purchase or possess such 
firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the 
transportation or receipt of a firearm obtained in 
conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section, and 
(C) shall not apply to the transportation of any 
firearm acquired in any State prior to the effective 
date of this chapter.... 
 (b) It shall be unlawful for any licensed 
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector to sell or deliver—... 
(3) any firearm to any person who the 
licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
does not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or 
other business entity, does not maintain a place of 
business in) the State in which the licensee's place of 
business is located, except that this paragraph (A) 
shall not apply to the sale or delivery of any rifle or 
shotgun to a resident of a State other than a State in 
which the licensee's place of business is located if the 
transferee meets in person with the transferor to 
accomplish the transfer, and the sale, delivery, and 
receipt fully comply with the legal conditions of sale 
in both such States (and any licensed manufacturer, 
importer or dealer shall be presumed, for purposes of 
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transfer the firearms to the FFL in the District of Columbia, but 
the Hansons objected to the fee. Instead, they challenged the 
constitutionality of the federal scheme.66  
The Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the law, 
assuming without deciding that it was the correct standard. 
After explaining why Congress passed the interstate sales ban 
in 1968,67 the court had to determine whether the law was 
 
this subparagraph, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, to have had actual knowledge of the State 
laws and published ordinances of both States), and 
(B) shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to 
any person for temporary use for lawful sporting 
purposes.... 
 
27 C.F.R. § 478.99(a), provides: 
 
Interstate sales or deliveries. A licensed 
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector shall not sell or deliver any firearm 
to any person not licensed under this part and who 
the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
does not reside in (or if a corporation or other 
business entity, does not maintain a place of business 
in) the State in which the licensee's place of business 
or activity is located: Provided, That the foregoing 
provisions of this paragraph (1) shall not apply to the 
sale or delivery of a rifle or shotgun (curio or relic, in 
the case of a licensed collector) to a resident of a State 
other than the State in which the licensee's place of 
business or collection premises is located if the 
requirements of § 478.96(c) are fully met, and (2) shall 
not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any 
person for temporary use for lawful sporting 
purposes (see § 478.97). 
66 See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 2018). 
67  
The district court accepted that when Congress 
enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 (Crime Control Act) and the Gun Control 
Act of 1968 there was an actual problem in need of 
solving. The findings and declarations set forth in the 
Crime Control Act reflect that Congress was of the 
view that “the existing Federal controls over 
[widespread traffic in firearms] do not adequately 
enable the States to control this traffic within their 
own borders through the exercise of their police 
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narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in the present 
day:  
 
The overarching question in a strict-scrutiny 
analysis of the laws and regulations at issue, it 
seems to us, is whether an in-state sales 
requirement remains justified by a compelling 
government interest and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest after the Gun Control Act was 
amended by the Brady Act and in light of federal 
regulations promulgated after the in-state sales 
requirement was enacted.68 
 
 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the ban passed strict 
scrutiny. “All parties to this suit concede that there is a 
compelling government interest in preventing circumvention 
of the handgun laws of various states.”69 And the law was 
 
power.” Congress had concluded that there was a 
“serious problem of individuals going across State 
lines to procure firearms which they could not 
lawfully obtain or possess in their own State,” and 
these interstate purchases were accomplished 
“without the knowledge of ... local authorities.” 
Congress found that individuals circumventing the 
laws of the state in which they resided included 
“large numbers of criminals and juveniles.” Congress 
had additionally concluded “that the acquisition on a 
mail-order basis of firearms other than a rifle or 
shotgun by nonlicensed individuals, from a place 
other than their State of residence, has materially 
tended to thwart the effectiveness of State laws and 
regulations, and local ordinances ....” Similarly, 
Congress found: 
that the sale or other disposition of 
concealable weapons by importers, manufacturers, 
and dealers holding Federal licenses, to nonresidents 
of the State in which the licensees’ places of business 
are located, has tended to make ineffective the laws, 
regulations, and ordinances in the several States and 
local jurisdictions regarding such firearms. . . .  
 
Id. at 705–06 (citations omitted). 
68 Id. at 706.  
69 Id. at 707.  
96                     7 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2020) 
 
 
narrowly tailored because the alternative of requiring every 
FFL to master the laws of all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia was unreasonable: 
 
There are more than 123,000 FFLs nationwide. It 
is unrealistic to expect that each of them can 
become, and remain, knowledgeable about the 
handgun laws of the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia, and the local laws within the 50 states 
and the District. The district court relied on 27 
C.F.R. § 478.24 to support the conclusion that 
FFLs can “ensure that their firearms transactions 
comport with state and local law.” But the 
compilation of state gun laws by the Director of 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives is more than 500 pages long, and it 
provides the full text of those laws. FFLs are not 
engaged in the practice of law, and we do not 
expect even an attorney in one state to master the 
laws of 49 other states in a particular area. 
Additionally, the compilation on which the 
district court relied is only updated annually. 
 
The laws of the various states differ as to who 
may lawfully possess a firearm. All but one state 
(Vermont) prohibits possession of a firearm by a 
felon, but the definitions of “felony” differ. 
Restrictions based on mental illness vary among 
the states. Some states prohibit the purchase of a 
firearm by drug abusers, and some restrict 
purchases by those who have abused alcohol. 
 
It is reasonable, however, for the federal 
government to expect that an FFL located in a 
state, and subject to state and local laws, can 
master and remain current on the firearm laws 
of that state. The in-state sales requirement is 
narrowly tailored to assure that an FFL who 
actually delivers a handgun to a buyer can 
reasonably be expected to know and comply 
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with the laws of the state in which the delivery 
occurs.70 
 
 According to the Fifth Circuit, it did not matter that 
federal laws allow interstate long gun sales (with the consent of 
both states). Obviously, FFLs are expected to be competent at 
complying with the long gun sales laws of every state. But the 
court explained that “at least some states have regulated the 
sale of handguns more extensively than they have regulated the 
sale of long guns.”71 Moreover, handguns were used more 
commonly in the crimes that inspired the Gun Control Act.  
 In fact, compliance with foreign state handgun laws is 
not particularly more difficult than compliance with such laws 
for handguns. As the Fifth Circuit admitted, a federal statute 
requires the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (“ATF”) to annually publish a book of the relevant 
gun laws of every state and of every locality therein. The book 
is supposed to be made available to FFLs so that they can 
examine and obey the laws of other states. Thanks to the 
worldwide web, that book is now readily available and can be 
updated as often at ATF wishes. 
On July 20, 2018, the Fifth Circuit denied a petition for 
rehearing en banc by an 8-7 vote. The dissenting judges issued 
three separate dissentals. Judge Elrod, joined by judges Smith, 
Jones, Willett, Ho, Duncan, and Engelhardt argued that the 
Two-Part Test that the Fifth Circuit applied, which most Circuit 
Courts have adopted, is inappropriate under Heller. Rather, 
Judge Jones believes an analysis based on text, history, and 
tradition is most consistent with Heller.72 This is the test the First 
Circuit had used prior to Gould,73 and notably, it is the test 
advocated by then-Judge Kavanaugh in the D.C. Circuit.74 
Judge Willett, joined by the other six dissenting judges, 
argued that the court should rehear the case en banc to 
determine the appropriate test: “How should judges evaluate 
 
70 Id. at 707–08 (citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 708. 
72 Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2018). Judge Elrod 
made a similar argument in a 2012 dissent. Houston v. City of New 
Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448–452 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009). 
74 See Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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laws that burden Americans’ Second Amendment rights—tiers 
of scrutiny vs. ‘text, history, and tradition’?”75 
Judge Ho—joined by the six other dissenters—wrote 
that the law fails strict scrutiny. He pointed out that the law was 
not the least restrictive means available because a law could 
serve the same purpose while allowing an FFL to deal with 
residents of two states:  
 
The Government does not contend (nor could it) 
that a dealer is fully capable of complying with 
the laws of one state, but incapable of complying 
with the laws of two. This alone demonstrates 
that a categorical ban on all interstate handgun 
sales is over-inclusive—it prohibits a significant 
number of transactions that fully comply with 
state law.76 
 
Judge Ho additionally pointed out that even theoretically FFLs 
would not actually have to learn the laws of all 50 states because 
most states rely on the same National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS): 
  
36 states think that relying on NICS adequately 
vindicates their interests. According to an FBI 
report cited by the Government, 36 states—
including every state in this circuit, as well as the 
District of Columbia—rely solely on NICS to run 
background checks. See FBI Criminal Justice 
Information Services, National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (NICS) Operations 3 





75 Mance, 896 F.3d at 398 (Willett, J., dissenting).  
76 Id. at 402 (Ho, J., dissenting). Indeed, the original 1968 Gun Control 
Act had also banned interstate long gun sales, but had allowed 
interstate long gun sales between contiguous states as long as both 
states enacted authorizing legislation. The interstate long gun sales 
ban was repealed by the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986; 
today, a FFL in one state can sell to a resident of any other state, as 
long as both states consent. 
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What’s more, the fact that nearly three-quarters 
of states rely entirely on NICS, and not on their 
own databases, further demonstrates why the 
interstate sales ban serves little purpose: If a D.C. 
resident wishes to buy a handgun, the dealer 
will run the same NICS background check, 
regardless of whether the dealer is based in D.C., 
Texas, or most other states. And in any event, 
even assuming the panel is correct that better 
information sharing would make the system 
more effective, that only furthers the point here: 
There are less restrictive alternatives to ensure 
compliance with state handgun laws.77 
 
 Judge Ho concluded by pointing out the irony of 
justifying additional restrictions on the basis that the existing 
restrictions are too complex to be understood on their own:  
 
The Government’s defense of the federal ban—
that state handgun laws are too complex to 
obey—is not just wrong under established 
precedent, it is troubling for a more fundamental 
reason. If handgun laws are too complex for law-
abiding citizens to follow, the answer is not to 
impose even more restrictive rules on the 
American people. The answer is to make the 
laws easier for all to understand and follow. The 
Government’s proposed prophylaxis—to 
protect against the violations of the few, we must 
burden the constitutional rights of the many—
turns the Second Amendment on its head. Our 
Founders crafted a Constitution to promote the 
liberty of the individual, not the convenience of 
the Government.78 
 
Notably, states that believe their handgun laws are too 
complex for nonresident sellers to comprehend remain free to 
prohibit residents from buying out-of-state. The practical effect 
of the federal ban is only to prohibit handgun sales that are 
permitted by the seller’s state and the buyer’s state.  
 
77 Id. at 403 (Ho, J., dissenting).  
78 Id. at 405 (Ho, J., dissenting). 
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The plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari in what became 
Mance v. Whitaker on November 19, 2018. The petition is still 
pending.  
F.  CAMPUS CARRY LAW UPHELD, GLASS V. PAXTON 
Texas enacted a Campus Carry Law in 2015, allowing 
certain permitholders to carry concealed handguns on college 
campuses.79 The law allows public colleges to impose 
reasonable regulations, but prevents them from prohibiting the 
carrying of handguns.80 “For example, the law permits public 
colleges to establish regulations concerning the storage of 
handguns in residence halls.”81 
“To become a license holder (with some exceptions), the 
applicant must be a Texas resident who is at least 21 years old, 
has not been convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors, is 
not chemically dependent, has participated in handgun 
training, and has passed a proficiency examination.”82   
Three University professors, including Dr. Jennifer 
Glass, challenged the Campus Carry Law. For simplicity’s sake, 
the Fifth Circuit referred only to Glass; we will do the same. 
Glass raised three claims: (1) “that the law and policy violate 
her First Amendment right to academic freedom by chilling her 
speech inside the classroom;” (2)  “that the law and policy 
violate her rights under the Second Amendment because 
firearm usage in her presence is not sufficiently ‘well-
regulated’;” and (3) “that the law and policy violate her right to 
equal protection because the University lacks a rational basis 
for determining where students can or cannot concealed-carry 
handguns on campus.”83 
In support of her First Amendment claim, Glass argued 
that “her classroom speech would be ‘dampened to some 
degree by the fear’ it could initiate gun violence in the class by 
students who have ‘one or more handguns hidden but at the 
ready if the gun owner is moved to anger and impulsive action.’ 
In an affidavit she expressed particular concern for ‘religiously 
 
79 Codified as Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.2031. 
80 § 411.2031(d-1). 
81 Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Tex. Gov’t 
Code § 411.2031(d)). 
82 Glass, 900 F. 3d at 236 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 411.172, 411.174, 
411.188).  
83 Id. at 237. 
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conservative students [who] have extreme views,’ as well as 
‘openly libertarian students,’ whom she ‘suspect[s] are more 
likely to own guns given their distaste for government.’”84 
The Fifth Circuit held that Glass lacked standing to 
bring her First Amendment claim because she failed to prove 
that the alleged harm was “certainly impending.” The court 
explained that “Glass cannot manufacture standing by self-
censoring her speech based on what she alleges to be a 
reasonable probability that concealed-carry license holders will 
intimidate professors and students in the classroom.”85 
In support of her Second Amendment claim, Glass 
argued that “the Campus Carry Law and University policy 
violate the Second Amendment because firearm usage in her 
presence is not sufficiently ‘well regulated.’”86 “Glass contends 
that to the extent the Second Amendment recognizes an 
individual right to carry firearms, persons not carrying arms 
have a right to the practice being well-regulated.”87 “‘Like it or 
not,’ Glass argues, ‘there is specific constitutional language that 
premises the right, whatever its extent, on the use of guns [as] 
‘well-regulated.’ ’ She argues that the prefatory clause places a 
‘condition’ on the individual right.”88 
 
To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit found that Heller 
precludes such an interpretation:  
 
Glass’s argument is foreclosed by Heller. In two 
separate locations in the majority opinion, the 
Court held that the Second Amendment’s 
prefatory clause does not limit its operative 
clause: “The [prefatory clause] does not limit the 
[operative clause] grammatically, but rather 
announces a purpose.” 554 U.S. at 577, 128 S.Ct. 
2783.  
Indeed, the “prefatory clause does not limit or 
expand the scope of the operative clause.” Id. at 
578, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Amendment’s first 
clause“ is prefatory and not a limitation on the 
 
84 Id. at 238 (brackets in original).  
85 Id. at 242. 
86 Id. at 243. 
87 Id. at 244. 
88 Id. 
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amendment itself.” Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 
444 (5th Cir. 2016). Because the operative clause 
provides the codification of the individual right, 
the prefatory clause cannot “limit or expand the 
scope” of the individual right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 
578, 128 S.Ct. 2783.89 
 
“The prefatory clause does not limit the scope of the 
individual right codified in the operative clause” so Glass 
“failed to state a claim under the Second Amendment.”90 
In support of her Equal Protection claim, Glass argued 
that “the Campus Carry Law and University policy violate her 
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the University lacks a rational basis for determining 
where students can or cannot concealed-carry handguns on 
campus.”91 
 
In her amended complaint, Glass alleges that 
“[t]here is no rational basis for the division in the 
state’s policies between where concealed carry 
of handguns is permitted and where it may be 
prohibited.” She does not challenge Texas’s 
purported government interest: public safety 
and self-defense. Instead, she argues that there is 
no rational basis for Texas to allow private 
universities to ban concealed carry but not 
public universities. In addition, she argues that 
there is no rational basis for the University to 
allow concealed carry in classrooms while 
simultaneously prohibiting the practice in other 
campus locations such as faculty offices, 
research laboratories, and residence halls.92 
 
Texas provided a rational response to each allegation. “First, the 
Campus Carry Law distinguishes between public and private 
universities in order to respect the property rights of private 
universities. Second, public safety and self-defense cannot be 





92 Id. at 245. 
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attending class is a core reason for students to travel to 
campus.”93 And third, “public safety and self-defense can still 
be achieved if concealed carry is banned in less-frequented 
areas such as faculty offices and research laboratories.”94 
Since “Texas’s rationales are arguable at the very least,” 
Glass’s Equal Protection claim failed.95 
 
 
VI.  SIXTH CIRCUIT 
A.  UPHOLDING GUN BAN FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
MISDEMEANOR IN DISTANT PAST. STIMMEL V. SESSIONS 
Terry Lee Stimmel pleaded no contest in 1997 to 
“knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to 
a family or household member,” a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.96 In 2002, he tried to purchase a firearm from 
Walmart but was denied as a domestic violence misdemeanant. 
After unsuccessfully appealing to the FBI, he challenged the 
constitutionality of the federal ban on domestic violence 
misdemeanants codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The Sixth 
Circuit, like every other Circuit Court to consider a Second 
Amendment challenge to the ban so far, upheld the law.97  
The court applied the Two-Part Test. In determining 
whether the law burdened the scope of the right, the court 
sought evidence of historical or longstanding regulations on 
domestic violence misdemeanants. After failing to find such 
evidence, the court assumed without deciding “that a domestic 
violence misdemeanant’s Second Amendment rights remain 
intact to some degree” and continued to Part Two.98 
The court applied intermediate scrutiny in Part Two 
primarily because “Stimmel, as a domestic violence 




95 Id. at 246. 
96 Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.25(A). 
97 Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 2018); See Kopel & 
Greenlee, supra note 1, at 242–44, 278–81, 305–06 (discussing cases 
from other circuits).  
98 Stimmel, 879 F.3d at 205. 
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Amendment’s core protected class as defined in Heller.”99 And 
because “Congress lightened the burden on the right by 
providing domestic violence misdemeanants with four 
mechanisms of relief from their firearm disability. They can (1) 
petition to set aside their conviction; (2) seek a pardon; (3) have 
their conviction expunged; or (4) have their civil rights fully 
restored.”100 “In sum, § 922(g)(9) places a substantial burden on 
the right, but does not touch the Second Amendment’s core—
intermediate scrutiny is appropriate here.”101 
The court emphasized that “[t]he burden of justifying § 
922(g)(9) under heightened scrutiny is demanding and remains 
with the government.”102 The government satisfied this burden 
by proving that a “reasonable fit” exists between disarming 
domestic violence misdemeanants and its compelling objective 
of preventing gun violence:  
 
On the government’s evidence, which Stimmel 
fails to rebut, it is reasonable to conclude that 
domestic abusers have high recidivism rates, 
pose a continued risk to their families, as well as 
law enforcement, are more likely to kill their 
victims when armed, and should therefore be 
disarmed. In accord with the unanimous view of 
those circuits that have addressed the question, 
we conclude the fit here is, at least, reasonable. 
Section § 922(g)(9) survives intermediate 
scrutiny.103 
 
The evidence that domestic violence offenders in 
general are much more likely than the general population to 
perpetrate criminal homicides or other major violent crimes is 
overwhelming. However, the evidence that one-time offenders 
remain dangerous even after decades of good behavior is thin. 




99 Id. at 206.  
100 Id. at 207. 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 211. 
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Because the government has offered, at best, 
minimal evidence that a non-recidivist domestic 
violence misdemeanant presents a heightened 
risk of reoffending decades after his or her 
conviction, it has yet to justify what is, 
effectively, a lifetime ban on a fundamental 
constitutional right.104 
 
In a 2016 statutory interpretation case on the federal 
domestic violence statute, Justice Thomas’s dissent also raised 
concerns about the prohibition, which is the only federal statute 
that uses a misdemeanor conviction to impose a lifetime ban on 
the exercise of a constitutional right. He criticized the majority 
for treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right.105 
B.  NO RIGHT TO SELL GUNS TO FELONS. UNITED STATES V. 
BACON 
Donte Bacon admitted that he “purchased the firearm” 
and “sold it ... with reasonable cause to know that [the 
purchaser was] a felon” in August of 2014.106 Later that month, 
“Bacon confirmed that he sold a different firearm, a 
semiautomatic pistol with an obliterated serial number, to a 
prohibited person.”107 Bacon was convicted of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) and (k) for selling a firearm to a prohibited 
person and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial 
number. He appealed to the Sixth Circuit.  
The Sixth Circuit seemingly placed the burden on Bacon 
to prove that the Second Amendment protects the right to sell 
arms to felons: “Bacon has not provided and we are unable to 
find any historical indication that the Second Amendment 
encompasses such sales.”108 This was erroneous. Under the 
 
104 Id. at 213 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
105 Voisine v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2272, 2291 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s reading that the statute 
encompasses reckless conduct); See David Kopel, Voisine v. United 
States - Post-Decision SCOTUScast, FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug. 8, 2016) 
(audio), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/podcasts/voisine-v-
united-states-post-decision-scotuscast.  
106 United States v. Bacon, 884 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2018) (brackets in 
original). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 611.  
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precedent of the Sixth Circuit, and of other circuits, the 
government bears the Part One burden of proof to show that a 
particular activity is outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment right as traditionally understood.109 
However, since there was Supreme Court precedent 
nearly on point, the court’s error was mostly a matter of 
semantics. Heller had stated: “nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons.”110 The prohibition on selling 
firearms to felons is thus easy to infer.  
The Sixth Circuit determined that Bacon asserted a 
Second Amendment challenge only to the ban on selling 
firearms to felons. As for the separate ban on selling firearms 
with obliterated serial numbers, the court explained in a 
footnote that “[e]ven if he had raised Second Amendment 
arguments regarding § 922(k), we are persuaded by the Third 
Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 100 
(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a defendant’s Second Amendment 
challenge and finding that ‘§ 922(k) would pass muster under 
either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny’).”111 
VII.  EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
A.  SUPPRESSORS AND SHORT-BARRELED RIFLES ARE NOT 
INDISPUTABLY PART OF SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT. 
UNITED STATES V. STEPP-ZAFFT 
After a search of Stepp-Zafft’s apartment produced 
“numerous firearms [including five unregistered short-
barreled rifles], grenade bodies, fuses, black powder, empty 
carbon dioxide pellet gun cylinders, and what appeared to be 
 
109 See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing 
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also 
Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681–82 (4th Cir. 2010). 
110 Bacon, 884 F.3d at 611–12 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27). 
111 Id. at 612 n.3; See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 1, at 204–05, 212–14, 
216, 236–37 (discussing the persuasive and well-reasoned Marzzarella 
opinion, which is a foundation of circuit jurisprudence on the Second 
Amendment).  
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two homemade silencers fashioned out of oil and fuel filters,”112 
Stepp-Zafft was convicted of possessing unregistered 
firearms—specifically, five short-barreled rifles, nine 
destructive devices, and two suppressors—in violation of 26 
U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. Those statutes, part of the National 
Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”), as amended, require possessors 
or manufacturers of such items to register those items and pay 
a tax. Stepp-Zafft had done neither. 
“On appeal, Stepp-Zafft contends that the registration 
requirement unconstitutionally infringes on a Second 
Amendment right to possess the short-barreled rifles and 
homemade silencers found in his apartment.” However, 
because Stepp-Zafft raised these issues for the first time on 
appeal, the court reviewed only for plain error.113 
Regarding the defendant’s untimely argument that 
short-barreled rifles (SBRs) are protected arms: “Heller said that 
there is no Second Amendment right to possess a short-barreled 
shotgun . . . and a plurality of the Court previously observed in 
a different context that a short-barreled rifle is a ‘concealable 
weapon’ that is ‘likely to be used for criminal 
purposes.’”114 Moreover, “[o]ther courts have seen no 
 
112 United States v. Stepp-Zafft, 733 F. App’x 327, 328 (8th Cir. 2018) 
(brackets added). “At trial, agents described the items seized from 
Stepp-Zafft’s apartment. All five of the unregistered short-barreled 
rifles had been modified from their original design. Two had been 
modified with barrels shorter than sixteen inches. The other three 
were originally designed and sold as pistols, but they had been 
converted into short-barreled rifles with the addition of a shoulder 
stock.” Id. 
113 Typically, a party must show “good cause” to raise a defect in an 
indictment for the first time at the appellate stage, but the government 
failed to present that argument so such a showing was not required in 
this case. Id. 
114 Id. at 328 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624; United States v. 
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 (1992)). 
Thompson/Center Arms had held that ATF may not impose the $200 
National Firearms Act (NFA) tax for the sale of kits that could be 
assembled into any of the following: 1. Legal single-shot rifle (long 
barrel plus stock), 2. Legal single-shot handgun (short barrel, no 
stock), or 3. NFA-covered short-barreled rifle (stock, short barrel). 
Thompson/Center was a split decision. Justice Souter announced the 
judgment of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor. Interpreting the NFA statute, they stated that by selling 
items that could be combined in various ways (one of which would 
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constitutional distinction between short-barreled shotguns and 
rifles in the wake of Heller.”115 Therefore “Stepp-Zafft’s 
constitutional claim is at least subject to reasonable dispute [so 
the] district court did not make an obvious error by failing to 
dismiss the charge sua sponte.”116 
As for whether suppressors are protected arms, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that “some courts after Heller have rejected 
his position on the ground that silencers are not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”117 And 
“because he did not raise this challenge in the district court, the 
parties did not present evidence on the purposes and common 
uses of silencers.” Therefore, “the claim is at least subject to 
reasonable dispute in light of existing authorities and the 
undeveloped record in this case,” so the “district court did not 
commit a plain error by declining to dismiss the charge on its 
own motion.”118 
The Stepp-Zafft decision is correct as far as it goes, since 
the district court was not on notice that registration 
requirements for SBRs and suppressors are plainly 
unconstitutional. However, it would be sloppy reasoning to 
assume that everything in the NFA is outside of the Second 
Amendment simply because Heller suggested that short-
barreled shotguns and machine guns are outside. 
 
require NFA registration), Thompson/Center had not “made” a NFA 
item. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the 
judgment. They reasoned that, under the statutory provisions at issue, 
the making of a firearm could not be completed until the firearm is 
assembled. Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Blackmun, 
Stevens, and Kennedy. They relied on legislative history and rejected 
application of the rule of lenity in a civil case. Thompson/Center was 
selling all the parts necessary to make a short-barreled rifle; the fact 
that other parts were included in the sale was irrelevant. Justice 
Stevens also dissented separately, emphasizing the danger of 
concealable firearms. 
115 Id. at 328 (citing United States v. Gilbert, 286 Fed. App’x 383, 386 
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cox, 235 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1227 (D. 
Kan. 2017); United States v. Gonzales, No. 2:10-cr-00967, 2011 WL 
5288727, at *6 (D. Utah Nov. 2, 2011)). 
116 Stepp-Zafft, 733 Fed. App’x at 328. 
117 Id. (citing United States v. McCartney, 357 Fed. App’x 73, 76 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Cox, 235 F.Supp.3d at 1227; United States v. Perkins, No. 
4:08CR3064, 2008 WL 4372821, at *4 (D. Neb. Sept. 23, 2008)). 
118 Stepp-Zafft, supra note 112, at *2. 
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For example, a student note in the Harvard Journal of Law 
& Public Policy argues that there is no good reason for regulating 
SBRs more stringently than other firearms. The note also casts 
doubt on ATF’s administrative interpretations expending the 
scope of the SBR statute, such as by attempting to control arm 
braces or forward grips for pistols.119 
Notably, a SBR is less lethal than a rifle with a longer 
barrel, due to reduced velocity and hence reduced kinetic 
energy. In contrast, short-barreled shotguns can be more lethal 
at close range, in the sense that the shorter barrel produces a 
wider shot spread. Whatever the reason, short-barreled 
shotguns have always been disproportionately used in crime, 
whereas SBRs are not. 
An article by Stephen Halbrook examined the legislative 
history of the NFA and found no support for treating 
“silencers” as NFA items. As Halbrook pointed out, sound 
moderators are standard equipment for hunting rifles in several 
European nations; there, the permit or license for rifle 
possession generally presumes that the user will (or must) use 
a sound moderator.120 
VIII.  NINTH CIRCUIT 
A.  AFFIRMING INJUNCTION AGAINST CALIFORNIA 
MAGAZINE CONFISCATION. DUNCAN V. BECERRA 
In Duncan v. Becerra,121 the Ninth Circuit issued an 
unpublished opinion upholding a preliminary injunction 
enjoining California from enforcing a statute that required 
persons who lawfully possess “large-capacity magazines” 
(supposedly, magazines capable of holding more than 10 
rounds) to dispossess them. Citizens were provided three 
options for dispossession: they could (1) “remove the large-
capacity magazine from the State;” (2) “sell the large-capacity 
 
119 See James A. D’Cruz, Half-Cocked: The Regulatory Framework of Short-
Barrel Firearms, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2017).  
120 Stephen P. Halbrook, Firearm Sound Moderators: Issues of 
Criminalization and the Second Amendment, 46 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 33 
(2015-2016). See generally, Allen Halbrook, The NFA Creates Some 
Particular Dangers for Non-Licensees Making or Modifying AR-Type Rifles 
and for Those Making Silencers, State Bar of Texas, 6th Annual 2017 
TXCLE Firearms Law symposium 7.VII. 
121 Duncan v. Becerra, 742 F. App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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magazine to a licensed firearm dealer;” or (3) “surrender the 
large-capacity magazine to a law enforcement agency for 
destruction.”122 
The district court held that the ban violates the Second 
Amendment—both under intermediate scrutiny and under 
what it called “the Heller test,”123 which simply “asks whether 
the law bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful 
purpose.”124 
As the district court found, the magazines are 
commonly owned by law-abiding citizens for self-defense. The 
court noted that some of the nation’s most popular handguns—
which Heller deemed the “quintessential self-defense 
weapon”—come with standard magazines larger than 10 
rounds. The court also found that such magazines would very 
likely be utilized by a present-day militia and would contribute 
to the common defense. Thus, the court found that the 
magazines are protected by the Second Amendment. 
The district court held that the ban failed intermediate 
scrutiny as well. The court deemed the magazine ban “a 
haphazard solution likely to have no effect on an exceedingly 
rare problem, while at the same time burdening the 
constitutional rights of other California law-abiding 
responsible citizen[s].”125 Although California had offered 
evidence from Michael Bloomberg organizations and similar 
groups claiming that “large” magazines make mass shootings 
worse, the district court carefully reviewed the evidence and 
found it shoddy and unpersuasive. 
Further, “it would be reasonable to infer, based on the 
State’s evidence, that a right to possess magazines that hold 
more than 10 rounds may promote self-defense,” meaning that 
the evidence showed public safety might actually be better 
served by increasing the availability of the banned magazines.126 
Thus, the “reasonable fit” between the challenged regulation 
and an important state interest did not exist, so the ban failed 
intermediate scrutiny. 
 
122 Cal. Penal Code § 32310(d)(1)-(3).  
123 Duncan v. Becerra, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1117–18 (S.D. Cal. 2017). 
124 Id. at 1117 (quoting Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S.Ct. 447, 
449 (2015) (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari)). 
125 Id. at 1124. 
126 Id. at 1121.  
FEDERAL CIRCUIT SECOND AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS 2018              111  
 
 
Federal appellate courts review district court 
preliminary injunctions only for abuse of discretion. By a 2-1 
vote, the panel found there had been no abuse of discretion. 
First, the district court was correct that “magazines for a 
weapon likely fall within the scope of the Second 
Amendment.”127 Second, “[a]lthough the district court applied 
two different tests, there is no reversible error if one of those 
tests follows the applicable legal principles and the district 
court ultimately reaches the same conclusion in both 
analyses.”128 The appropriate test under circuit precedent was 
intermediate scrutiny.  
Finally, “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion 
by concluding that [the law] did not pass intermediate scrutiny. 
The district court’s review of the evidence included numerous 
judgment calls regarding the quality, type, and reliability of the 
evidence, as well as repeated credibility determinations.”129 On 
appeal, “California articulates no actual error made by the 
district court, but, rather, multiple instances where it disagrees 
with the district court's conclusion or analysis regarding certain 
pieces of evidence. This is insufficient to establish that the 
district court's findings of fact and its application of the legal 
standard to those facts were ‘illogical, implausible, or without 
support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the 
record.’”130 
In a 2015 case, a different three-judge panel of the Ninth 
Circuit had upheld a district court’s decision not to grant a 
preliminary injunction against a similar confiscation law 
enacted by a Bay Area town, Sunnyvale.131 Although the 
evidence in the Fyock v. Sunnyvale and Duncan cases  differered, 
the key point was that neither decision by the district judges in 
those cases was an abuse of discretion. Rather, the decision to 
grant or not grant the preliminary injunction was based on the 
district judges’ reasonable discretion in weighing the evidence 
before them. When a preliminary injunction is being appealed, 
the only job for the appellate judges is to see if there is an abuse 
of discretion; the appellate judges are not supposed to reweigh 
the evidence. The fact that two district court judges saw similar 
 
127 Duncan, 742 F. App’x at 220. 
128 Id. at 220.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 222. (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 
131 Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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evidence and came to different conclusions does not mean that 
either judge is guilty of abuse of discretion. 
The majority wrote that Judge Wallace’s dissent was 
improperly reweighing the evidence. For example, Judge 
Wallace wrote that the confiscation law could be upheld based 
on some statistics supplied by one of Michael Bloomberg’s 
organizations. Yet the district court had specifically explained 
why those statistics lacked reliability and credibility: they were 
“incomplete studies from unreliable sources upon which 
experts base speculative explanation and predictions.”132 
Like the Second Circuit in another magazine ban case,133 
Judge Wallace seemed to favor a very weak standard of 
intermediate scrutiny review for Second Amendment cases: as 
long as the government could provide some evidence, that was 
sufficient—notwithstanding the other side’s evidence showing 
that the government evidence is flawed or unpersuasive. 
B.  FOR COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA 
ISLANDS, DISTRICT COURT DECISION AGAINST HANDGUN 
BAN MAY NOT BE APPEALED BY WOULD-BE INTERVENOR. 
RADICH V. GUERRERO 
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
(CNMI) is a United States Territory in the northern Pacific 
Ocean. The southernmost island in the Mariana Archipelago is 
Guam, although Guam is a separate territory.134 Most 
inhabitants of the CNMI live on the islands of Saipan, Tinian, 
and Rota. 
In 2016, a decision of the federal district court for the 
District of the Northern Mariana Islands held certain gun 
 
132 Duncan, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. 
133 New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 
(2d Cir. 2015); Kopel & Greenlee, at 288–97 (discussing Second 
Circuit’s uniquely weak standard of review).  
134 Guam became part of the United States when it was seized from 
Spain in 1898 in the Spanish-American War. In 1899, Spain sold the 
rest of the Mariana Archipelago to Germany. Japan seized the 
archipelago from Germany in World War I. After World War II, the 
United Nations declared the archipelago (not including Guam) to be 
a United Nations Trust Territory to be administered by the United 
States. Pursuant to a vote of Congress and of the Mariana people, the 
territory became an associated commonwealth of the United States, 
with a constitution adopted in 1978.  
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controls in the CNMI to be contrary to the Second 
Amendment.135 The district court began by pointing out that the 
Covenant establishing the Commonwealth expressly made the 
Second and Fourteenth Amendments applicable to the 
CNMI.136 
The district court found the following unconstitutional: 
 
• A law prohibiting lawful permanent CNMI 
residents who were not of native blood from being 
issued gun permits. 
• A ban on issuing gun permits for home defense. 
• A handgun possession ban. 
• A handgun import ban. 137 
 
The Commonwealth’s legislature promptly enacted a 
new gun control statute that complied with the district court’s 
decision. The Commonwealth elected not to appeal the district 
court decision to the Ninth Circuit.138 During the period for 
filing an appeal, the Tanapag Middle School Parent Teacher 
Student Association (PTSA) attempted to intervene in the case 
and file an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The district court 
rejected the motion to intervene.139 
In July 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s denial of the motion to intervene because the PTSA 
lacked standing.140 Even if the PTSA were correct that the Radich 
decision would lead to metal detectors being installed in 
schools, PTSA is a voluntary organization, and the Radich 
decision did not require PTSA “to do or refrain from doing 
anything.”141  
PTSA also claimed organizational standing because 
some members are teachers and teachers have a duty to protect 
students. However, organizational standing must be “germane 
 
135 See generally Radich v. Guerrero, No. 1:14-CV-00020, 2016 WL 
1212437 (D.N. Mar. I. Mar. 28, 2016). 
136 Id. at 2. 
137 Id. at 9.  
138 The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Guam and the CNMI. The 
CNMI legislature later enacted a handgun ban that would go into 
effect only if the district court decision were overturned. 
139 Radich v. Guerrero, 1:14-CV-00020, 2016 WL 3034159 (D.N. Mar. I. 
May 27, 2016). 
140 Radich v. Guerrero, 729 Fed. App’x 623 (9th Cir. 2018). 
141 Id. at 624 (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013)). 
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to the organization’s purpose.” Article III standing is not 
conferred merely by “a desire to vindicate value interests.” 
C.  OPEN CARRY IS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AND MAY NOT BE 
LIMITED ONLY TO SECURITY GUARDS. YOUNG V. HAWAII 
In Peruta v. San Diego, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that 
the Second Amendment does not protect the concealed carrying 
of handguns; addressing the issue that Peruta had carefully 
avoided, in July 2018, a 2-1 panel in Young v. Hawaii held that 
Hawaii's near-total prohibition on the open carrying of 
handguns for lawful self-defense violates the right to bear 
arms.142 
Hawaii's restrictions on firearms carry are the most 
extreme of any state. Carrying or transporting a loaded firearm 
outside of one’s property is generally forbidden. Unloaded and 
cased firearms may be transported while going to or from a 
gunsmith, a hunting ground, and a few other places. Carrying 
a loaded handgun in public, either openly or concealed, 
requires a permit. Concealed carry permits are close to nil (4 
permits have been issued in the last 18 years). Only a few dozen 
open carry permits exist in the State, and they are only for 
security guards while on the job. 
After being denied a permit, George K. Young, Jr. 
brought a lawsuit in the federal district court for the district of 
Hawaii.143 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, and Young appealed. For procedural reasons, the State 
of Hawaii was out of the case by the appellate stage, but the 
County of Hawaii (the Big Island) remained as a defendant. The 
State nevertheless filed an amicus brief. 
The Ninth Circuit panel examined Heller and McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, which had explicated that the textual right to 
“keep” arms is distinct from the right to “bear” arms. The latter 
includes the right to bear arms for self-defense outside the 
home, but (as Heller said and McDonald reaffirmed), the exercise 
of the right may be excluded from “sensitive places, such as 
schools and government buildings.”144 In Young, “The State’s 
 
142 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). 
143 Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Haw. 2012). 
144 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
786 (2010). 
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amicus brief asks us to stretch this list of presumptively lawful 
measures to allow all laws ‘preserving public safety.’ This 
argument borders on the absurd. Surely not all areas of the 
public are as sensitive as schools or government buildings, nor 
is it, as the State suggests, a ‘very small and reasonable step to 
view virtually the entire public sphere as a sensitive place.’”145 
Expressly following the methodology of Heller and 
McDonald, the Young court carefully examined history and 
tradition. Early sources, such as Blackstone, considered the 
right to bear arms for self-defense to be a natural right; so did 
the first American treatise on constitutional law, St. George 
Tucker’s 1803 annotated American edition of Blackstone. Like 
Heller, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Tucker:  
 
And in advocating for the prerogative of the 
Judiciary to strike down unconstitutional 
statutes, Tucker wrote: “If, for example, congress 
were to pass a law prohibiting any person from 
bearing arms, as a means of preventing 
insurrections, the judicial courts, . . . would be 
able to pronounce decidedly upon the 
constitutionality of these means.” see also 
Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second 
Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial 
Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-
Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 637–38 (2012).146 
 
 Following the Heller methodology, the Ninth Circuit 
studied nineteenth-century cases on the right to arms, 
especially cases from before the Civil War. The majority of the 
cases—including the cases that Heller said were correct 
explications of the right—upheld prohibitions on concealed 
carry, but rejected similar restrictions on open carry.  
During the nineteenth century, the South was the region 
most enthusiastic about gun control, and some Southern 
controls were based on racial animus. 
  
 
145 Young, 896 F.3d at 1053 n.6. 
146 Id. at 1054. Also included in the natural rights discussion were 
Leonard W. Levy’s Origins of the Bill of Rights (quoting a prominent 
colonial newspaper on the right to arms as “a natural right”) and 
David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller's Lesson for the 
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (2008). 
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The dissent faults our reliance on decisions from 
the South, implying that the thorough analysis 
found in such opinions must have been the 
product of a “culture where slavery, honor, 
violence, and the public carrying of weapons 
were intertwined.”... To say the least, we are 
puzzled. The dissent overlooks the fact that the 
Southern cases on which we rely only arose 
because the legislatures in those states had 
enacted restrictions on the public carry of 
firearms. Indeed, were it the case that the 
Southern culture of slavery animated concerns 
to protect the right to open carry, why would the 
Georgia legislature have sought to ban open 
carry in the first place? 
 
As a more fundamental matter, too, we cannot 
agree with the dissent’s choice to cast aside 
Southern cases. Heller placed great emphasis on 
cases from the South, and Nunn in particular. We 
are an inferior court. Can we really, while 
keeping a straight face, now say that such cases 
have little persuasive effect in analyzing the 
contours of the Second Amendment? We think 
not.147 
 
 As the Young majority acknowledged, a minority of the 
nineteenth-century cases denied that there is right to defensive 
carry; these cases start with Arkansas’s 1842 State v. Buzzard.148 
These cases are explicitly based on the assumption that the right 
to keep and bear arms is solely to foster the militia. 
 
 
147 Young, 896 F.3d at 1057 n.9. Nunn was an 1846 Georgia case striking 
a ban on most handguns, striking a ban on open carry, and upholding 
a ban on concealed carry. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). Heller quotes 
and lauds Nunn more than any other case. The article that the Young 
dissent relied on is Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism 
and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 
YALE L.J. FORUM 121 (2015). Cornell is a prolific and sometimes 
unreliable historian. See David T. Hardy, Lawyers, Historians and ‘Law 
Office History’, 46 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 1 (2015).  
148 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842). 
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Yet, with Heller on the books, cases in Buzzard’s 
flock furnish us with little instructive value. 
That’s because Heller made clear that the Second 
Amendment is, and always has been, an 
individual right centered on self-defense; it has 
never been a right only to be exercised in 
connection with a militia....And bound as the 
inferior court that we are, we may only assess 
whether the right to bear arms extends outside 
the home on the understanding that the right is 
an individual one centered on self-defense. 
Thus, Heller knocks out the load-bearing bricks 
in the foundation of cases like Buzzard, for those 
courts only approved broad limitations on the 
public carry of weapons because such 
limitations in no way detracted from the 
common defense of the state.149 
 
 An 1830s Massachusetts statute provided a model 
adopted by several other states. According to the statute, if 
Person A provided well-founded evidence to a court that 
Person B threatened “injury or a breach of the peace,” then the 
court could issue an order presenting Person B with two 
choices: (1) Stop carrying arms in public or (2) If you want to 
continue carrying arms, then you must post a bond for good 
behavior (“surety of the peace”). Despite the court order, 
Person B could continue carrying arms, without need for 
posting a bond, under two circumstances: (1) militia service or 
(2) if Person B had “good cause” to fear for his safety. 
Professor Saul  Cornell and the Young dissent 
characterize these statutes as broad bans on public carrying. 
This is contrary to the text. The statutes applied only to persons 
who were identified in court by specific evidence as being 
particularly dangerous. Even then, they could still carry if they 
posted a bond. 
 In 1328, English King Edward II created the Statute of 
Northampton, which forbade subjects “to go nor ride armed by 
night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the 
Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.” There was 
an exception for the king’s servants. It is possible to read the 
statute as a comprehensive ban on carry. The dissent relied on 
 
149 Young, 896 F.3d at 1057–58. 
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the argument of scholar Patrick J. Charles, who contends that 
the Statute of Northampton was part of the common law and 
was adopted in America, and therefore, there is no right to carry 
arms.150 
 However,  the Statute of Northampton was not 
interpreted in England as a carry ban—at least not by the time 
the American colonies were on the scene. William Hawkins's 
1716 treatise explained that “no wearing of Arms is within the 
meaning of this Statute, unless it be accompanied with such 
Circumstances as are apt to terrify the People.”151 
 Hawkins’s view is consistent with the result of a famous 
trial from 1686, Sir John Knight’s Case. The Chief Justice of the 
King’s Bench explained that the Statute of Northampton applies 
only to “people who go armed to terrify the King’s subjects.”152  
 “More fundamentally,” wrote the Young majority, “we 
respectfully decline the County’s and the State’s invitation to 
import English law wholesale into our Second Amendment 
jurisprudence....Indeed, there is a scholarly consensus that the 
1689 English right to have arms was less protective than its 
American counterpart.”153  
 
150 Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment outside the 
Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why It Matters, 64 CLEVELAND 
STATE L. REV. 373 (2016). 
151 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 489 (8th 
ed., 1824). Hawkins is the main source for Heller’s statement that 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons are not within the protection of 
the right to arms. Although Hawkins was writing about carrying 
“dangerous and unusual” arms, the Heller majority expanded 
Hawkins’s point to cover the possession of “dangerous and unusual” 
arms. 
152 Knight, who was a political opponent of King James II, had carried 
a blunderbuss to church because some Irish Catholics had made 
credible threats to assassinate him. King James II was pro-Catholic, 
while Knight was an enthusiast for persecution of Catholics. As one 
observer of the trial recounted, the jury acquitted Knight “not thinking 
he did it with any ill design.” For more on the Statute of Northampton 
and Knight's Case see NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE 
A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 91–101 (2d ed. 2017). 
153 Young, 896 F.3d at 1065. For example, as St. George Tucker noted, 
English law defined as “treason” any gathering of a certain number of 
armed men without prior government approval, but such gatherings 
were a protected right under the American Constitution. See id. 
(quoting St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of 
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 Early American commentators interpreted common law 
limits on arms carrying as applying only to persons who carried 
“offensively” or in a “terrifying” manner or who carried 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons. The 1843 North Carolina 
State v. Huntly explained “the carrying of a gun per se 
constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose—either of 
business or amusement—the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry 
his gun. It is the wicked purpose—and the mischievous result—
which essentially constitute the crime.”154 
 
Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the 
United States, vol. 5, app., n.B, at 19). 
154 25 N.C. 418, 422–23 (1843). The phrase “business or amusement” 
was a legal term of art, to encompass all peaceable activity. See, e.g., 
The Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (“[T]he ports of a nation are open to the private and 
public ships of a friendly power, whose subjects have also liberty 
without special license, to enter the country for business or 
amusement. . . .”); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, No. 741 (Cir. 
Ct. E.D. Penn. 1833) (Supreme Court Justice Baldwin, acting as Circuit 
Judge) (“[A]ny traveller who comes into Pennsylvania upon a 
temporary excursion for business or amusement”); Baxter v. Taber, 4 
Mass. 361, 367 (1808) (“[H]e may live with his family, and pursue his 
business, or amusements, at his pleasure, either on land or water. . . 
.”); Respublica v. Richards, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 224 (Penn. 1795) (same 
language as Johnson v. Tompkins). 
 According to Cornell, Charles, and the Young dissent, all carrying 
(except when mandated by the government) was considered 
inherently “terrifying.” The majority answers: 
 
What an odd way it would be to write a criminal 
statute!....For instance, Maine’s 1821 Northampton 
analogue authorized the arrest of “all affrayers, 
rioters, disturbers or breakers of the peace, and such 
as shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or 
terror of the good citizens of this State, or such others 
as may utter any menaces or threatening speeches.” 
1821 Me. Laws 285. If riding armed were itself 
unlawful because it terrorized the good citizens of 
Maine, it strains credulity to suggest that Maine 
drafters would have felt the need to clarify such 
reasoning right in the middle of the statute's 
operative provisions. Indeed, why only clarify the 
consequences of riding armed, and no other 
prohibited conduct? 
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 In all, “whatever Northampton banned on the shores of 
England,” the American right to carry common weapons 
openly for self-defense “was not hemmed in by longstanding 
bans on carrying.”155 
 Because text, history, and tradition show that peaceful 
carrying of common arms is part of the Second Amendment, 
the next question was the standard of judicial review. Bearing 
arms is part of the core of the Second Amendment. “While the 
Amendment’s guarantee of a right to ‘keep’ arms effectuates the 
core purpose of self-defense within the home, the separate right 
to ‘bear’ arms protects that core purpose outside the home.”156 
 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, “We next ask whether 
section 134-9 [Hawaii statute that specifies open carry permits 
may be issued only to security professionals] ‘amounts to a 
destruction’ of the core Second Amendment right to carry a 
firearm openly for self-defense….If so, the law is 
‘unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.’”157 
 As counsel for Hawaii County had admitted at oral 
argument, “no one other than a security guard—or someone 
similarly employed—had ever been issued an open carry 
license.” Thus: 
 
Restrictions challenged under the Second 
Amendment must be analyzed with regard to 
their effect on the typical, law-abiding 
citizen....An individual right that does not apply 
to the ordinary citizen would be a contradiction 
 
Young, 896 F.3d at 1067. The “odd” Cornell-Charles reading 
of early American state statutes would conflict with “neighboring 
criminal provisions.” For example, Delaware allowed a slave to “go 
armed with any dangerous weapon” if the master gave permission. 
Yet by the Cornell et al. theory, nobody in Delaware could carry any 
weapon, except when mandated by government. Id.  
Likewise, Tennessee authorized sheriffs to arrest anyone 
“armed with the intention of committing a riot or affray.” But 
according to Cornell, carrying an arm at all was a serious crime. So 
why limit arrest powers only to “riot and affray”? “Why on earth 
would Tennessee have so limited a sheriff’s authorization to arrest if 
going armed was itself unlawful?” Id. 
155 Id. at 1067–68 (quoting Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 660–61 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017)). 
156 Id. at 1069.  
157 Id. at 1070.  
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in terms....Just as the Second Amendment does 
not protect a right to bear arms only in 
connection with a militia, it surely does not 
protect a right to bear arms only as a security 
guard. The typical, law-abiding citizen in the 
State of Hawaii is therefore entirely foreclosed 
from exercising the core Second Amendment 
right to bear arms for self-defense. It follows that 
section 134-9 “amounts to a destruction” of a 
core right, and as such, it is infirm “[u]nder any 
of the standards of scrutiny.”158 
 
 The Hawaii portion of the statute limiting open carry to 
security professionals was held unconstitutional. The decision 
below was reversed and remanded. Notably, the plaintiffs did 
not challenge a separate requirement in Hawaii: that carry 
permits be issued only “Where the urgency or the need has been 
sufficiently indicated.” With no information in the record 
“showing the stringency of the requirement,” the court did not 
address “whether such requirement violates the Second 
Amendment.”159 
 In 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted Hawaii County’s 
petition of en banc rehearing. As this Article goes to press, oral 
argument has not yet been held. 
D.  STATE MAY EXEMPT RETIRED PEACE OFFICERS FROM 
CARRY BAN NEAR SCHOOLS WITHOUT EXEMPTING 
CONCEALED-CARRY PERMITHOLDERS, GALLINGER V. 
BECERRA 
California passed the Gun-Free School Zone Act in 1994, 
which banned firearms from school grounds and within school 
zones (defined as a 1,000-foot radius around school grounds). 
The statute provided two exceptions: concealed-carry 
permitholders and retired peace officers. 
Reacting against the trend in other states towards armed 
defense of schools, California amended its Gun-Free School 
Zone Act in 2015. The amendment as introduced would have 
eliminated the exceptions for both permitholders and retired 
 
158 Id. at 1071. 
159 Id. at 1050 n.2.  
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law enforcement, but as passed, the amendment retained the 
exception for retired law enforcement. 
A group of permitholders and firearms organizations 
challenged the amendment, arguing that it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by 
irrationally treating permitholders and retired law enforcement 
differently. 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit had held in Silveira v. Lockyer 
that an exemption for retired officers from an “assault 
weapons” ban violated the Equal Protection Clause.160 The 
Gallinger court determined that Silveira was distinguishable “for 
the commonsense reason that assault weapons are more 
dangerous than other kinds of firearms.”161 The court explained 
that “while the inherent risks that accompany carrying assault 
weapons for self-defense or public-safety purposes may 
outweigh any increased benefits to a retired officer's or the 
public's safety, the same need not be true for other kinds of 
firearms.”162 
After evading Silveira’s precedent, the Gallinger court 
upheld the law based on the legislature’s determination that 
“(1) retired peace officers are at a heightened risk of danger 
based on their previous exposure to crime, and (2) allowing 
them to carry firearms other than assault weapons on school 
grounds mitigates that risk and increases officer safety.”163 
The Ninth Circuit was also persuaded that retired 
officers carrying firearms enhanced public safety “due to the 
extensive training in the safe storage and operation of firearms 
that law enforcement personnel receive.”164 It is unclear how 
training in the safe storage of firearms improves one’s ability to 
carry a firearm responsibly. And it is not necessarily true that a 
retired officer is better trained than a permitholder; licensing 
authorities in California may require permitholders to complete 
a 24-hour course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer 




160 Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 
161 Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2018).  
162 Id. at 1019. 
163 Id. at 1020. 
164 Id.  
165 Cal. Penal Code § 26165. 
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E.  UPHOLDING CHAMBER LOAD INDICATOR, MAGAZINE 
DETACHMENT MECHANISM, AND MICROSTAMPING 
REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW SEMIAUTOMATIC HANDGUNS: 
PENA V. LINDLEY 
A handgun must be included on the California 
Department of Justice’s (“CDOJ”) handgun roster to be sold 
commercially in the state. California often adds new 
requirements for inclusion on the roster. The plaintiffs 
challenged three requirements of semiautomatic handguns: (1) 
that new models contain a chamber load indicator166 (“CLI,” 
defined as a “device that plainly indicates that a cartridge is in 
the firing chamber”);167 that each new model contain a 
magazine detachment mechanism168 (“MDM,” defined as “a 
mechanism that prevents a semiautomatic pistol that has a 
detachable magazine from operating to strike the primer of 
ammunition in the firing chamber when a detachable magazine 
is not inserted in the semiautomatic pistol.”);169 and that each be 
equipped with microstamping features (meaning that “each 
such pistol must imprint two sets of microscopic arrays of 
characters that identify the make, model, and serial number of 
the pistol onto the cartridge or shell casing of each fired 
round”).170 These requirements do not apply to handguns 
already on the roster, which are grandfathered as long as the 
manufacturer continuously pays a fee and the firearm does not 
fail a retest for other requirements.171  
Applying the Two-Part Test, the court assumed without 
deciding that the laws burden the right to keep and bear arms, 
and quickly proceeded to Part Two.  
The court continued to move quickly in Part Two. The 
court did not  determine whether the laws implicate the core of 
the Second Amendment right—even though under circuit 
precedent the determination is a necessary inquiry in 
determining the appropriate level of heightened scrutiny.172 
 
166 Id.  § 31910(b)(5). 
167 Id. § 16380. 
168 Id. § 31910(b)(5). 
169 Id. § 16900. 
170 Id. § 31910(b)(7). 
171 Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 983 (9th Cir. 2018). 
172 See U.S. v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (“the level of 
scrutiny should depend on (1) how close the law comes to the core of 
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Instead, the Pena court decided that intermediate scrutiny was 
appropriate “[b]ecause the restrictions do not substantially 
burden any such right.”173 The burden was unsubstantial 
because the grandfathered firearms remained available174 and 
because the laws “place almost no burden on the physical 
exercise of Second Amendment rights.”175  
For the mandatory magazine disconnect mechanism 
(MDM), the court was unconcerned about semiautomatic 
handguns being rendered useless without a magazine inserted: 
“Although MDMs might prevent a gun from firing at will, it is 
likely a rare occurrence when someone has time to put a round 
from outside a magazine in the chamber without inserting the 
magazine itself.”176 Therefore, “[t]he legislative judgment that 
preventing cases of accidental discharge outweighs the need for 
discharging a gun without the magazine in place is 
reasonable.”177 This was pure speculation without evidence; 
under standard rules of intermediate scrutiny, the government 
cannot carry its burden of proof by speculating.178  
The Ninth Circut’s application of intermediate scrutiny 
for the second Amendment, was typically undemanding. 
Because a chamber lock indicator (CLI) “lets someone know 
that a gun is loaded without even having to pick it up to check” 
and because a “MDM prevents a firearm from shooting unless 
a magazine is inserted,” “[t]he CLI and MDM requirements 
[]reasonably fit with California’s interest in public safety.”179 
Whatever the merits of mandatory magazine 
disconnects and chamber lock indicators, all parties agreed that 
 
the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity of the law's burden 
on the right.”) (quotations omitted).  
173 Pena, 898 F.3d at 977. 
174 Id. at 978–79. 
175 Id. at 978. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 980. 
178 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (The 
government’s “burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or 
conjecture.” Instead, it “must demonstrate that the harms it recites are 
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them.”). 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (“We know of no other enumerated 
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a 
freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach. . . .  The Second 
Amendment . . . is the very product of an interest balancing by the 
people.”). 
179 Id. 
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they could be added to a firearm for a few extra dollars in 
manufacturing costs. The double-microstamping mandate was 
different. According to the plaintiffs, it was impossible at any 
price. However, the Ninth Circuit upheld it;  because double-
microstamping requirement would theoretically “address the 
substantial problem of untraceable bullets at crime scenes and 
the value of a reasonable means of identification,” the court 
held that the mandate reasonably fits with California’s interests 
in public safety and crime prevention.180  
The court was undeterred by “evidence that gun 
manufacturers have not produced a functioning, commercially 
available semiautomatic pistol equipped with the 
microstamping technology and they have no plans to attempt 
to do so.”181 The Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed the concern: 
“[s]imply because no gun manufacturer is ‘even considering 
trying’ to implement the technology, it does not follow that 
microstamping is technologically infeasible.”182 “We need not 
accept wholesale that manufacturers will decline to implement 
this new public safety technology in the face of California’s 
evidence that the technology is available and that compliance is 
feasible.”183  
California  provided no evidence to contradict the 
plaintiff’s claim that “no new handguns being sold in the 
United States can satisfy CDOJ’s testing protocol and, therefore, 
no new handguns qualify for California’s approved-as-safe 
roster.”184 Significantly, as the dissent pointed out, “[s]o far as 
we can tell from the meager record before us, no one—
including CDOJ—has ever tested any weapon against 
California’s protocol to see whether it is technologically 
feasible.”185 Therefore, the court upheld a safety requirement 
that may be entirely impossible to comply with. There was no 
evidence in the record that compliance with the California 
mandate is possible. The effect of this law is extreme; it freezes 
firearms technology in time.  
Heller made clear that constitutional rights cannot be 
technologically fossilized at some particular moment in history: 
 
180 Id. at 986. 
181 Id. at 983 (quotations omitted). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Pena, 898 F.3d at 988 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
185 Id. 




Some have made the argument, bordering on the 
frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 
18th century are protected by the Second 
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional 
rights that way. Just as the First Amendment 
protects modern forms of communications, e.g., 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 
844, 849, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997), 
and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern 
forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 35–36, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 
(2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima 
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable 
arms, even those that were not in existence at the 
time of the founding.186 
 
The reasoning applies the same to the sixteenth century, the 
eighteenth century and the twenty-first. Just as the government 
cannot prohibit the freedom of speech through iPhones or the 
internet, the government cannot prohibit the development of 
the right to keep and bear arms through modern or future 
technologies. 
Judge Bybee concurred in part and dissented in part. He 
joined in the portions of the majority opinion upholding the CLI 
and MDM requirements. But he dissented regarding the 
microstamping requirement due to his concern “that the testing 
protocol adopted by the California Department of Justice [ ] in 
its regulations is so demanding that no gun manufacturer can 
meet it.”187 Judge Bybee noted that the infeasibility of the 
microstamping requirement was preventing the MDM and CLI 
requirements from being implemented:  
 
Under the appropriate Second Amendment 
analysis, I cannot conclude that there is a 
reasonable fit between CDOJ’s microstamping 
requirement and the legislature’s object in 
solving handgun crimes. The result of CDOJ’s 
restrictive testing protocol is undisputed: since 
 
186 Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. 
187 Pena, 898 F.3d at 988 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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at least 2013, no new handguns have been sold 
commercially in California, and that means that 
no guns were sold with the microstamping 
feature. That fact has an important secondary 
effect—it means that no new handguns are being 
sold commercially with the MDM and CLI safety 
features either. 
 
The consequence is obvious. Today, no one in 
California can purchase handguns that have the 
safety features the legislature thought critical for 
saving lives, nor can any Californian purchase 
guns with the microstamping feature the 
legislature thought important to assist police. 
The only guns commercially sold in California 
are grandfathered from these provisions. This is 
a totally perverse result. If the legislature (or 
CDOJ, seeking to implement the legislature’s 
instructions) has adopted safety requirements 
that no gun manufacturer can satisfy, then the 
legislature has effectively banned the sale of new 
handguns in California. The effect of this result 
on our intermediate-scrutiny analysis is clear: 
the fit between California’s interest in solving 
handgun crimes and the microstamping 
requirement would not only fail to be 
reasonable, it would be non-existent. The 
requirement would severely restrict what 
handguns Californians can purchase without 
advancing the State’s interest in solving 
handgun crimes—or any government interest—
one iota.188 
 
Judge Bybee conducted his own Two-Part analysis; he did not 
make the assumptions the majority had made to fast-track the 
analysis. He found that the microstamping requirement does 
burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment; in Part 
Two, he would have reversed and remanded based on the lack 
of evidence in the record that firearms manufacturers are 
capable of implementing the microstamping requirement 
successfully. 
 
188 Id. at 988–89 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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IX.  TENTH CIRCUIT 
A.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR ARREST FOR LAWFUL OPEN 
CARRY: SANDBERG V. ENGLEWOOD, COLORADO 
On March 14, 2014, Westin Sandberg was running 
errands in Englewood, Colorado, while open-carrying a 9mm 
handgun on his hip. While in an auto shop—where he was 
granted permission by the owner to continue carrying his 
firearm—two officers confronted the Iraq War veteran with 
their firearms drawn and seized his handgun and 21 rounds of 
ammunition. After being detained for four hours, Sandberg was 
charged with disorderly conduct, and his firearm, holster, 
ammunition, and magazine were confiscated. Within months, 
the charge was dropped, and Sandberg’s property was returned 
to him.  
Sandberg later filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that, 
among other things, the officers violated his Second 
Amendment rights “by detaining him, searching him, and 
issuing him a citation, solely because he was openly carrying a 
firearm.”189 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the claim was 
properly dismissed by the district court because “when the 
events at issue in this case occurred it was not clearly 
established that the Second Amendment guaranteed a citizen 
the right to openly carry a firearm in public without risk of 
facing police action.”190 This was because “[t]here is no case 
from the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme Court holding that 
Heller’s articulation of a right to keep and bear arms inside the 
home must necessarily extend to a right to keep and bear arms 
outside the home.”191  
The Tenth Circuit had previously held that the Second 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to concealed carry.192 
In another case, involving a prohibition against arms carrying 
on United States Postal Service property, a 2-1 panel had 
 
189 Sandberg v. Englewood, Colorado, 727 F. App’x 950, 961 (10th Cir. 
2018). 
190 Id. at 962.  
191 Id. at 961. 
192 Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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declined to determine whether a right to bear arms exists but 
had hypothesized such a right arguendo.193  
The Sandberg court acknowledged a Seventh Circuit case 
that definitively held that the right to bear arms applies beyond 
the home,194 three circuit court cases that assumed the right 
applies beyond the home,195 and a dissent from the denial of 
certiorari in which Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, 
argued that “[t]he most natural reading of [the Second 
Amendment] encompasses public carry.”196 But this was not 
enough to “clearly establish” the right, as Sandberg needed to 
do.  
B.  SHORT-BARRELED RIFLES AND SUPPRESSORS NOT 
PROTECTED ARMS: U.S. V. COX 
In 2013, Kansas passed the Second Amendment 
Protection Act (SAPA).197 SAPA provides, in part:  
 
A personal firearm, a firearm accessory or 
ammunition that is manufactured commercially 
or privately and owned in Kansas and that 
remains within the borders of Kansas is not 
subject to any federal law, treaty, federal 
regulation, or federal executive action, including 
any federal firearm or ammunition registration 
program, under the authority of congress to 
regulate interstate commerce. It is declared by 
the legislature that those items have not traveled 
in interstate commerce. This section applies to a 
firearm, a firearm accessory or ammunition that 
is manufactured commercially or privately and 
owned in the state of Kansas.198 
   
 
193 Bonidy v. United States Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015). 
194 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
195 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 
724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81 (2d Cir. 2012).  
196 Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1998 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
197 Codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-1201, -1211(2014). 
198 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-1204(a). 
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Relying on SAPA, Shane Cox began selling homemade 
suppressors at his army-surplus store in Chanute, Kansas, with 
a copy of SAPA posted next to the display case. Jeremy Kettler 
purchased one; both parties believed the transaction was legal 
under SAPA as long as the suppressor never left Kansas. In fact, 
Kettler boasted about his new suppressor on Facebook.  
Soon after, Cox and Kettler were charged with several 
crimes: 
  
[F]ederal prosecutors secured a grand jury 
indictment against Cox and Kettler . . . Counts 2, 
3, and 4 each charged Cox with possessing an 
unregistered firearm—a destructive device, a 
short-barreled rifle, and another destructive 
device, respectively—in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 
5861(d). Count 5 accused both Cox and Kettler of 
conspiring, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, to violate the 
NFA by building and selling an unregistered 
silencer. Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 charged Cox 
with five violations of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(e) for 
transferring five silencers—four to recipients 
identified by their initials plus a fifth to “an 
undercover law enforcement officer.” Cox R. 
vol. 1 at 34. Count 10 accused Cox of making a 
silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). Count 
12 alleged that between June 20, 2014, and 
February 4, 2015, Cox had “engaged in the 
business of manufacturing and dealing in” 
silencers in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(a). Cox 
R. vol. 1 at 34. And count 13 charged Kettler with 
possessing a silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 
5861(d).199 
 
Cox and Kettler admitted that they violated the NFA but 
appealed their convictions, arguing that the NFA is 
unconstitutional and that SAPA provides them a valid defense.  
First, the court  held that “the NFA is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s taxing power, as well as its authority to enact any 
laws ‘necessary and proper’ to carry out that power.”200  
 
199 United States v. Cox, 906 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2018).  
200 Id. at 1179. 
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Second, the court considered whether the NFA 
comports with the Second Amendment. Here, Cox and Kettler 
presented different arguments, but they both maintained that 
the Second Amendment protected their right to possess short-
barreled rifles and to make, sell, and possess suppressors.  
Cox argued that the NFA was unconstitutional under 
Heller. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit applied the Two-Part Test, 
but none of the challenges made it past Part One. The Tenth 
Circuit held that short-barreled shotguns fall outside the right’s 
guarantee based on “Heller’s conclusion that short-barreled 
shotguns—close analogues to short-barreled rifles—belong in 
that category of weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”201  
Turning to suppressors, the parties argued:  
 
{S]ilencers are in common use (more common, 
says Kettler, than handguns were in the District 
of Columbia when the Court decided Heller) and 
that they’re very rarely used to commit crimes—
“except on television and in the movies.” 
Kettler’s Opening Br. at 34. Further, they claim 
that silencers protect the shooter’s (and 
bystanders’) hearing and, “by reducing muzzle 
flinch and the disorientation that can follow a 
loud shot,” can improve accuracy. Cox’s 
Opening Br. at 45. And because the alternative—
donning earmuffs—takes up precious time and 
suppresses surrounding sounds, they argue that 
these hearing-protection and accuracy benefits 
make silencers particularly valuable for “the 
core lawful purpose of home defense.”202 
 
This was irrelevant, however, because the court determined 
that suppressors are not arms at all:  
 
According to Heller, “the Second Amendment 
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that 
constitute bearable arms.” 554 U.S. at 582, 128 
 
201 Id. at 1185. 
202 Id. at 1186. Earmuffs are not an “alternative” to sound suppressors; 
each type of hearing protection supplements the other to further 
reduce pressure on the ear drum. 
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S.Ct. 2783 (emphasis added). An instrument 
need not have existed at the time of the founding 
to fall within the amendment’s ambit, but it must 
fit the founding-era definition of an “Arm[ 
].” Id. at 581, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (citing two 
dictionaries from the eighteenth, and one from 
the nineteenth, century). Then and now, that 
means, the Second Amendment covers 
“[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence,” or 
“any thing that a man wears for his defence, or 
takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at 
or strike another.” Id. at 581, 128 S.Ct. 2783 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). A 
silencer is a firearm accessory; it’s not a weapon 
in itself (nor is it “armour of defence”). 
Accordingly, it can’t be a “bearable arm” 
protected by the Second Amendment.203       
                                                             
Judge Hartz filed a short concurrence to emphasize that, “In 
determining that silencers are not protected by the Second 
Amendment, we explain that they are not ‘bearable arms.’ We 
had no occasion to consider whether items that are not 
themselves bearable arms but are necessary to the operation of 
a firearm (think ammunition) are also protected.”204 
The Tenth Circuit also upheld the NFA’s restrictions on 
making and selling suppressors. The court explained that “[t]he 
NFA’s requirements that firearms dealers and manufacturers 
register and pay taxes annually fit neatly into that category of 
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’”205 identified by 
Heller, including “laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.”206 More importantly, the court 
had already held that suppressors are not protected arms. 
“Even if the Second Amendment covers the right to buy and 
sell arms in the abstract, it can’t in practice protect the right to 




204 Id. at 1196.  
205 Id. at 1187 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26).  
206 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
207 Cox, 906 F.3d at 1187. 
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Next, the court considered whether the NFA taxes 
violate the Second Amendment by “imposing a charge for the 
enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution.”208 
“Under Murdock and Cox [v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 
(1941)], seminal cases in the Court’s ‘fee jurisprudence,’ the 
government may collect a fee to defray administrative and 
maintenance costs associated with the exercise of a 
constitutional (usually First Amendment) right, but it can’t 
impose a general revenue tax on the exercise of such a right.”209 
The rule did not matter here, however, since the court had 
already decided that short-barreled rifles and suppressors are 
not protected by the right to arms.  
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the 
defendants’ reliance on SAPA was a valid defense. It was not. 
“That general mistake-of-law rule forecloses Cox and Kettler’s 
proposed defense—that they wrongly believed, in reliance on 
the SAPA, that federal firearms regulations didn’t reach their 
Kansas-centric activities. To be criminally liable, Cox and 
Kettler didn’t need to know that their acts were ‘illegal, wrong, 
or blameworthy.’”210 But as the court noted, “Cox’s and 
Kettler’s reliance on the SAPA did, in the end, mitigate their 
sentences, if not their guilt. . . That benefit turned out to be two 
years’ probation for Kettler and one year’s for Cox. (The NFA 
allows for a penalty of up to ten years in prison, a fine of up to 
$10,000, or both for violating any of its provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 
5871.).”211 
CONCLUSION 
 The decisions of 2018 continue the post-Heller approach 
of upholding all provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and 
of the National Firearms Act of 1934. As usual, the prohibited 
persons cases were easy under Heller and post-Heller circuit 
doctrine.  
 
208 Id. (quoting Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 
(1943)). It is worth noting that the right to keep and bear arms is not 
granted by the Constitution. Rather, “it has always been widely 
understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth 
Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.  
209 Cox, 906 F.3d at 1187. 
210 Id. at 1190 (quoting U.S. v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, 
J., concurring)). 
211 Id. at 1195. 
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 Restrictions on firearms commerce were easy as applied 
to unlicensed persons willfully selling arms to sketchy 
characters. But the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding the ban on 
handgun sales by federally licensed firearms dealers to 
residents of consenting other states had questionable reasoning. 
 Nullification of the right to bear arms remains a 
continuing problem in some states. In the Second Circuit, 
treating the Second Amendment as a second-class right would 
actually be an improvement from the current jurisprudence. 
There, New York City was allowed to continue its mean-
spirited policy of preventing handgun owners in Staten Island 
from practicing gun safety in New Jersey, prohibiting residents 
of the Bronx from participating in target competitions in 
Connecticut, and forbidding New York City residents to take 
their registered handguns from one home to another.  
 There were a number of victories for the Second 
Amendment in 2018. The Fifth Circuit protected the ability of 
States to extend the right of self-defense to college campuses. 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the right to bear arms (openly) 
and the right to keep standard-capacity magazines. Based on 
recent history, however, there is reason to expect that the en 
banc court will reverse these well-reasoned decisions.  
 Although residents of the fifty States may not pay much 
attention to U.S. Territories, the citizens of the Territories are 
American citizens, and their rights are just as important as the 
rights of other citizens. Accordingly, the final demise of the 
racial ban, handgun ban, and self-defense ban in the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands is good news 
for ordered liberty. 
